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This paper studies tax shifting of excise taxes on alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages
in Denmark. We use a unique data set collected by Statistics Denmark focusing on six
episodes of tax changes: three tax cuts and three tax hikes. We find that excise taxes
on beer and soda are overshifted but those on liquor are undershifted. We also find
that the pass-through is inversely related to the size of the tax change and that there are
asymmetric effects of tax changes on soda. Finally, the tax pass-through on beer and soda
is an increasing function of the distance to the German border.
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1. Introduction
It is well known that within a model with full competition, excise taxes (as
well as ad valorem taxes) are fully passed on to prices, leading to a one-for-
one change in after-tax prices.1 The effect of a change in the excise tax on
the after-tax price is less clear under imperfect competition, however. Excise
taxes may in this case be undershifted or overshifted, depending on the elas-
ticity of the demand function, on the relative slopes of the marginal cost and
inverse demand functions, and on the number of firms and the possibility of
entry. In single-product oligopoly models it can be shown that there is over-
* Bergman: University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, building 26, DK-1353 Copen-
hagen, Denmark (Michael.Bergman@econ.ku.dk); Hansen: Copenhagen Business School,
Porcelaenshaven 16A, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark (nlh.eco@cbs.dk). The viewpoints and
conclusions stated are the responsibility of the individual contributors, and do not necessar-
ily reflect the views of institutions we are affiliated to. We thank Bo William Hansen and
Jakob Egholt Søgaard for excellent research assistance. We also thank two anonymous ref-
erees, Klaus Kristensen, Birgitte Sloth, Peter Birch Sørensen, and seminar participants at
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for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from EPRN is gratefully acknowl-
edged
1 Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) survey both the theoretical advances and empirical studies of
tax pass-through.
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shifting if demand is sufficiently convex; see Katz and Rosen (1985), Stern
(1987), Besley (1989), and Delipalla and Keen (1992). The same conclusion
also holds in an oligopoly model with heterogeneous goods, as shown by An-
derson et al. (2001).
A potential problem is that overshifting requires a high degree of convex-
ity, which is very often ruled out by standard assumptions underlying the
oligopoly model. In particular, there is overshifting only when the demand
curve is steeper than the marginal revenue curve. Formby et al. (1982) show
that it is possible that the marginal revenue curve is positively sloped when
market demand is convex. Furthermore, if individual demand is linear, it is
easily shown that market demand will be convex. More recently, Hamilton
(2008) has shown that in a model with multiproduct firms (retailers selling
a wide variety of products), overshifting occurs except when demand is con-
vex, a result opposite to the case when there is one homogeneous good or
heterogeneous goods. The intuitive explanation is that an increase in the ex-
cise tax leads firms to reduce product variety, leading to less competition and
therefore an increased excise tax pass-through. This effect is absent if de-
mand is highly convex. Thus, excise taxes are undershifted in this case. From
a theoretical viewpoint, one cannot therefore rule out the possibility that there
is either under- or overshifting of excise taxes. It is therefore an empirical
question whether excise taxes are undershifted, overshifted, or fully shifted to
consumers.
The purpose of this paper is to study shifting of excise taxes on beverages
(both alcoholic and nonalcoholic) at the micro level in Denmark. We focus on
a total of six episodes of tax changes during the period 1997 to 2005. There
are two episodes of tax changes on beer (a tax hike in 1997 and a tax cut
in 2005), three episodes for soda (two tax hikes in 1998 and 2001, and one
tax cut in 2003), and one episode of tax cuts on liquor (in 2003). Increases
in excise taxes are in general used either to raise tax revenue or to discourage
consumption of goods that have negative public-health effects. This last argu-
ment has seldom been used in the Danish debate motivating the changes in
the excise taxes mentioned above. Instead, the underlying reason for tax hikes
was to raise tax revenue, whereas the tax cuts were implemented in order to
prevent further increases in cross-border shopping between Denmark and Ger-
many, where alcohol taxes are much lower. We provide empirical evidence on
how proximity to the German border affects the tax pass-through. Since our
sample includes both tax hikes and tax cuts, we can examine the symmetry of
tax pass-through.
Our study extends the literature in several ways. First, we focus on both
the effect of excise taxes on homogeneous goods and the dispersion of these
effects across outlets and across regions. Second, we examine the effects of
both tax hikes and tax cuts on the same type of good. Third, we examine
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whether proximity to the German border affects the size of the excise tax
pass-through. Fourth, a specific feature of the Danish retail market is that it
is centralized, giving retailers greater bargaining power over the suppliers and
allowing them to compete over customers.
Our paper is related to the empirical literature focusing on excise taxes,
in particular excise tax changes on soda (Berardi et al. 2016; Falbe et al.
2015; Cawley and Frisvold, 2017; Grogger, 2017) and alcohol taxes (Young
and Bielin´ska-Kwapisz 2002; Kenkel, 2005; Harding et al. 2010; Carbonnier,
2013; Conlon and Rao, 2016).
The paper is organized in the following way. In section 2 we provide
an overview of the empirical literature. Section 3 discusses the institutional
framework, including the specifics of the Danish retail market. Section 4 de-
scribes the data in detail. Section 5 contains our empirical analysis. Border
effects are analyzed in section 6, and finally section 7 concludes.
2. Previous Literature
There are an increasing number of empirical studies in the literature of the
effects of excise-tax changes on prices.2 The main result from these studies is
that tax incidence is heterogeneous across products: for some types of goods
there is less than full shifting, whereas for other products the evidence sug-
gests overshifting – see for example Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen
(1999). More recent studies seem to confirm these findings. Carbonnier (2007)
studies two VAT reforms in France, where the ad valorem tax was cut on car
sales in 1987 and on housing repair services in 1999. He finds that tax shifting
is higher on the housing repair service than on car sales, which is interpreted
as evidence supporting the view that the former market is more competitive
than the latter. Still, the empirical evidence suggests undershifting of ad val-
orem taxes during these two events. In a similar study, Zápal (2014) finds
undershifting during the VAT reform in the Czech Republic in 2004 when the
standard VAT tax rate was cut from 22 % to 19 % and the classification of
commodities into standard and reduced VAT was changed. The data used in
this study is very comprehensive and covers almost eight hundred commodi-
ties included in the CPI. The results suggest that small tax cuts (VAT declined
from 22 % to 19 %) have no effect on prices, whereas there is undershifting
for larger tax increases (VAT increased from 5 % to 19 %).
There is a growing literature on the effects of changes in excise taxes on
alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages. The conclusions from this literature on
2 Poterba (1996) reviews the early empirical studies going back to the 1930s, whereas Fuller-
ton and Metcalf (2002) review both theory and more recent empirical results.
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the tax pass-through are also inconclusive. Some studies find undershifting,
whereas other studies find overshifting or full shifting of excise taxes. This
empirical literature is summarized in table 1. One of the first studies of tax in-
cidence of excise taxes on alcoholic beverages in the United Kingdom – Baker
and Brechling (1992) – found that excise taxes on beer and spirits were fully
passed on to consumers, whereas for wine they found evidence suggesting
overshifting. This study relied on aggregate retail price indexes. Besley and
Rosen (1996) studied a limited number of goods, including Coca-Cola, and
found that the excise tax on this product was overshifted to consumers. Young
and Bielin´ska-Kwapisz (2002) examined whether beer taxes are good proxies
for the price of alcohol and analyzed also how taxes on alcoholic beverages
are passed through to consumers. Using U.S. data, they found that beer taxes
are poor predictors of alcohol prices and that excise taxes are overshifted to
consumers. Kenkel (2005) collected data on several brands of alcoholic bever-
ages in Alaska and estimated the tax pass-through of the tax hike in October
2002. The main result is that excise taxes are overshifted (except for Miller
beer): prices increase by 1.40–4.9 times the tax change. He also observes a
high degree of heterogeneity both across brands and across different products.
Common to these two last-mentioned studies is that they only examine the
effects of tax hikes and they do not distinguish between types of stores or lo-
cations of stores, two aspects that may be of interest. Stehr (2007) relied on
ACCRA data allowing him to empirically evaluate the impact of excise taxes,
by extending the sample used by Young and Bielin´ska-Kwapisz (2002). The
results still suggested overshifting of excise taxes on spirits, but tax changes
on beer were fully shifted to consumers.
The implementation of the sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) tax in Berke-
ley, California, in March 2015 is a natural experiment studied in a number of
papers; see Falbe et al. (2015), Falbe et al. (2016), and Cawley and Frisvold
(2017). Using different data sources, these papers all find that the SSB tax was
undershifted to consumers. The size of the tax change stands out compared to
changes in excise taxes in general: the $0.01/oz tax increase implied a change
in the after-tax price of 10 % on a can of soda costing $2. SSB taxes have also
been adopted in France and in Mexico. Berardi et al. (2016) study the effects
of a new excise tax on drinks containing added sugar – a soda tax – introduced
in France in January 2012. They find that taxes were fully shifted on to soda
prices, whereas there was less than full pass-through on other beverages such
as fruit drinks and flavored waters. Grogger (2017) studies the effects of the
SSB tax that was adopted in 2014 in Mexico and finds evidence of overshift-
ing.
There are few additional papers using a combination of time-series and
cross-section analysis of the incidence of excise taxes. Harding et al. (2010)
measure the excise tax incidence on cigarettes and beer, using Nielsen Homes-
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can data.3 They find almost full shifting of cigarette taxes and undershifting of
beer taxes. In addition, they estimate border effects and find significantly neg-
ative effects on cigarette and beer prices if bordering states have lower taxes.
Carbonnier (2013) compares the incidence of per-unit and ad valorem taxes
on beer and aperitifs in France and finds that the effect of the former exceeds
that of the latter. Shrestha and Markowitz (2016) use data on four different
brands, study two tax hike events, and analyze whether the two major merg-
ers in the beer industry have affected tax pass-through. They find that excise
taxes are overshifted: a 10-cent increase in taxes on a six-pack of beer led to a
17-cent increase in after-tax prices during the period 2000–2014. Conlon and
Rao (2016) estimate the effects of excise tax increases in Connecticut and in
Illinois in July 2011. They find, using a unique data set from Nielsen Home-
scan, that tax increases on spirits were overshifted to consumers. However,
they also note that a large share of stores did not adjust prices when the tax
was increased.
Our unique data set allows us to study many different aspects that have been
the focus in the previous literature and also some aspects not covered before.
We study three different types of beverages and six excise tax changes, both
tax cuts and tax hikes. The data set also allows us to examine spillovers from
tax changes on one type of beverage to the other two types. Lastly, since after-
tax prices on all three types of beverages are considerably lower in Germany,
we consider the effects of proximity to Germany on the tax pass-through.
There are also other related studies focusing on specific products apart from
beverages. Karp and Perloff (1989), estimating both the market structure and
the tax incidence of ad valorem taxes on the Japanese television market, find
that the tax is significantly overshifted to consumers on the color-television
market, but they cannot reject full shifting on black-and-white television sets.
They also find that the tax incidence varies with the size of the tax rate change.
The tax incidence falls as the ad valorem tax rate increases. Delipalla and
O’Donnel (2001), studying the European cigarette industry, find that the in-
cidence of excise taxes always is greater than the incidence of ad valorem
taxes. However, in countries relying on ad valorem taxation, such as in south-
ern Europe, there is full shifting (and overshifting of excise taxes), whereas in
northern Europe, where countries to a larger extent rely on excise or specific
taxes, there is full shifting of excise taxes and undershifting of ad valorem
taxes. DeCicca et al. (2013) find that the extent of tax shifting also depends on
the extent to which consumers undertake search for volume discounts and on
whether consumers engage in cross-state border trade. Doyle and Samphan-
tharak (2008), studying the incidence of sales tax changes on gasoline prices
3 The published version of this paper excludes measures of the tax incidence of beer and
focuses solely on cigarettes.
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in the Midwest states, find undershifting of tax cuts and almost full shifting of
tax hikes. In addition, they find that less than full shifting occurred in the least
concentrated local areas when the sales tax was increased. Alm et al. (2009)
study the gasoline market in the USA. Using data from all 50 U.S. states, they
find that there is full shifting of gasoline taxes in urban states and undershifting
in rural states, a result suggesting that in more competitive markets, taxes are
fully shifted to consumers. Also studying gasoline taxes but distinguishing be-
tween federal and state taxes, Chouinard and Perloff (2004) find that a larger
portion of state taxes are shifted to consumers in small states than in larger
states. Comparing federal and state taxes, they find that there is undershifting
of federal taxes and almost full shifting of state taxes.
In the next section, we first provide a brief overview of the Danish retail
market and discuss the particularities of the excise tax changes on beverages,
which we will analyze empirically.
3. The Institutional Framework
The Danish retail market is characterized by high concentration among both
food retailers and suppliers, according to international standards; see Einars-
son (2008) and the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (2011). The
three largest grocery chains account for around 90 percent of total sales in
groceries. There is almost no competition from foreign chains; they account
for around 10 percent of the market and are concentrated in the discount seg-
ment of the market. The high level of concentration in the retail sector enables
grocery chains to exercise high market power over suppliers. In response to
this, there are only a few suppliers; three major suppliers account for the ma-
jority of the market. Regarding alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, supply
comes from only two suppliers. Even though the retail market is concentrated,
the retailers have greater bargaining power over the suppliers and at the same
time compete for customers. This is reflected by the extensive use of special
offerings in order to attract customers. Many products or brands are consid-
ered as appeal products in their weekly brochures; see Danish Competition
and Consumer Authority (2011). Another distinguishing feature of the Dan-
ish retail sector is that it is characterized by many small supermarkets situated
close to each other and very few hypermarkets. This implies that productiv-
ity may be lower in general, since the market does not exploit economies of
scale to the same extent as in other countries. One important reason why the
market is structured in this way is the Planning Act, which regulates the size
and location of stores. In addition, there is a Danish act that regulates opening
hours. This act has been liberalized; from 2012 it has only regulated opening
hours on holidays.
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The beverages we examine in this paper are all sold in general grocery
stores and supermarkets as well as in specialized wine and liquor stores. There
is no regulation prohibiting a retailer from offering special prices, and prices
are set by the chain or by the individual store. Given that supermarkets are sit-
uated close to one another, it can be expected that they compete for customers.
This is a specific feature of the Danish market structure that could potentially
affect the tax pass-through. However, neither the retail market nor the supply
sector can be regarded as fully competitive, and therefore we would expect to
find both under- and overshifting of excise taxes as well as instances of full
shifting. Since the market is segmented, the degree of competition may vary
across time as well as across regions. Moreover, it may be that the excise tax
pass-through varies across brands. We study six tax events, and implicitly we
take into account changes in the degree of competition over time. Regional
aspects and differences across brands will also be studied.
There are in total six episodes of changes in excise taxes during the pe-
riod 1997–2005: two tax changes on beer, three on soda, and one on liquor.
Table 2 provides examples of prices prior to the tax change and the implied
change in the excise tax, all measured in DKK. The tax on beer was increased
by 0.038 DKK or by 0.05 DKK per bottle, depending on alcohol per unit vol-
ume, on May 1, 1997 (see table 2 for specific tax changes for two different
brands); on January 9, 2005 the tax was cut by 0.14 DKK or 0.18 DKK, re-
spectively.4 For soda the excise tax was increased on January 1, 1998 from
0.80 DKK per liter to 1.00 DKK per liter, corresponding to 0.13 DKK on av-
erage per 50-cl bottle (the average price on soda was 6.88 DKK at the time)
and then further increased on January 1, 2001 to 1.65 DKK per liter (corre-
sponding to 0.41 DKK per 50-cl bottle); on October 1, 2003 the excise tax was
cut to 1.15 DKK per liter (corresponding to 0.31 DKK per 50-cl bottle). This
allows us to study the symmetry of effects of excise taxes on prices of soda.
The tax on liquor was cut by 125 DKK per unit of 100-percent-pure alcohol on
October 1, 2003. This corresponds to a decrease of the tax by 36.93 DKK on
average for a bottle of liquor costing on average 139.25 DKK at the time. Ta-
ble 2 provides two specific examples illustrating that the tax change is hetero-
geneous across different brands. In the following analysis we use the specific
tax change on each type of beverage measured in DKK.
4 The excise tax on beer was also changed on October 1, 2004 so that the tax reflected the
alcohol content. This change was neutral in that prices of beer were not affected.
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Table 2
Prices Prior to the Tax Change and the Change in the Excise Tax for Specific
Beverages
Beer
Event: May 1997 Event: January 2005
Price Tax change Price Tax change
Tuborg Grøn 4.76 0.038 4.15 0.14
Carlsberg Sort Guld 6.81 0.05 6.90 0.18
Soda
Event: January 1998 Event: January 2001
Price Tax change Price Tax change
Coca-Cola (50 cl) 7.57 0.13 9.19 0.41
Tuborg Squash (50 cl) 7.52 0.13 9.54 0.41
Soda Liquor
Event: October 2003 Event: October 2003
Price Tax change Price Tax change
Coca-Cola (33 cl) 6.99 0.21 Gammel Dansk 93.12 41.56
Tuborg Squash (50 cl) 5.79 0.31 Gin, Gordon Dry 128.73 43.75
Note: All prices and tax changes are measured in DKK.
4. Data
The data set contains micro data collected by Statistics Denmark in order to
compute the Danish Consumer Price Index, covering the period January 1997
until December 2005 (108 months). The methodology used for compiling the
data is provided in Statistics Denmark (2005). From this database we extract
prices on beer, soda, and liquor.5
The raw database on the three types of beverages is made up of 114,615
monthly price records, or on average about 1061 observations per month.
Prices are collected once each month (between the 7th and the 15th) from
a selection of stores. Individual price quotes refer to a specific item sold in
a particular retail outlet. The data set is subject to statistical confidentiality
restrictions and does not reveal the name or location of a given outlet. For
each item we observe the following information: the price of the item, the
year and month the price was collected, the year and month the previous price
5 Hansen and Hansen (2007) have used the full set of data to study price-setting behavior in
Denmark.
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was collected, the quantity content of the product, the brand name of the item,
a numeric product code, a numeric product category code, the name of the
product category, a numeric code for a given outlet chain, and a numeric outlet
code. Together the four numeric codes relating to products and retail outlets
allow us to identify and track each individual item, i.e., a specific item in a
specific retail outlet. The product category code corresponds to the COICOP
5-digit code, whereas the data on individual prices from a retailer can be seen
as a subdivision of the product category into the elementary product level (a
6-digit COICOP level) and further down to the specific brand. In addition to
this data we have also information about the zip code of each specific store,
allowing us to distinguish between stores located in different regions of Den-
mark. The data set is considered to be of a high quality and well suited for our
purpose. Statistics Denmark has subjected the data to plausibility checks in
order to detect possible errors such as extreme prices. However, not all price
quotes are directly linked to an individual item sold in a particular outlet. In
these cases prices are eliminated from the data set. There are no statistically
imputed prices included in the data set.
Even though the data set is comprehensive, prices are not collected monthly
from the same retail outlet during the full sample, and there are also some gaps
in the data for specific outlets. Usually, there is a three-year window where
prices on specific products are collected from the same outlet. The collected
data on soda is an exception. For this type of beverage there are very short
price spells. The number of price records for a specific product also changes
over time. Very few prices are collected for some specific brands. For exam-
ple, before January 2000 Danish Statistics collected 200 prices on the Danish
liquor Old Danish (Gammel Dansk), but since October 2003 it has only col-
lected 11 prices. For these reasons it is not possible to study the price behavior
on the same product across different stores using the full sample. Since not all
products are sold in the same retail outlet, we cannot analyze the effects of
excise tax changes on one product on prices for other similar products. How-
ever, since our purpose is to study the excise tax pass-through during the six
tax events, this is not crucial.
Another important characteristic of the data is that prices are inclusive of
all types of sales, rebates, and promotions. Unlike liquor, which is hardly ever
on sale, beer and soda are appeal products that grocery chains advertise with
significant rebates in their weekly brochures to attract customers. Rebates of
20–40 percent for weekly periods and only a few weeks in between are not
uncommon; see Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (2011). This
can lead to a higher frequency of price adjustment for these products. Using
a filter (filter B) suggested by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), we construct
reference price series for our data and then use these price trajectories instead
of the raw data in our regression analysis. Comparing the raw data with the
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reference prices, we note that there are very few differences even for beer and
soda. The reason for this is probably that rebates occur regularly and hence
net out in our calculations. Usually there are only a very few price changes
6 months prior to the tax event. The same holds for the 12 months after each
event. Therefore we only focus on estimates using the unfiltered data.6
The raw data set covering the six tax events includes 1605 price records of
nonalcoholic and alcoholic beverages divided into 811 price records for beer,
639 for soda, and 155 for liquor. We have manually checked the data and cor-
rected or excluded price records that clearly are misreported. We have used the
following procedure. First, we check whether the previous price was collected
in the previous month. If not, we exclude those price records. Second, we ex-
clude price records where the content of the package had changed. Finally,
we exclude price records for which there is no corresponding price record on
the date of the tax event. For beer we find 23 price records where the lagged
data was collected on another date than the previous month, 9 records where
the content had changed and where there was no information about the new
content, so that we could not compute the tax change in DKK, and 2 cases
when the lagged price was missing. This implies that there are 777 available
price records for beer. Using the same procedure for soda, we found 9 price
records where the lagged price was not collected the month prior to the tax
event, 23 where the content had changed, and 10 where the lagged price was
missing. We therefore have a total of 597 price records for soda. Finally, for
liquor we found 17 cases where the content had changed, so that there are 138
price records available.
Table 3 shows the total number of available observations for each type of
beverage and for each tax event. In the first column we report the number
of product groups at the 5-digit COICOP level, next follows the number of
specific brands collected from a number of stores (“# stores” in the table)
belonging to a particular chain of stores, the number of chains (“# chains”)
located in a specific region, and the number of zip codes (“# zip”) at the 2-digit
level. Finally, we also report the maximum number of observations (“# obs”)
of each type of beverage in the month where excise taxes was changed. As
can be seen in the table, the total number of observations available on each
tax event is different. For example, the data set contains 777 monthly price
records for beer, of which 418 cover the first tax event in 1997 and 359 the
second event in 2005. For soda there are 597 available price records divided
over the three tax events, with roughly 200 records each. Finally, for liquor
the number of available price records is 138, all covering a tax cut.
6 We have run all our empirical tests below using the reference series and found that none of
our conclusions were affected.
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Table 3
Summary of Data Available on Tax Events
# product groups # brands # stores # chains # zip # obs
Beer 1997:5 2 25 63 17 43 418
2005:1 3 35 61 16 30 359
Soda 1998:1 2 16 62 17 42 208
2001:1 2 13 57 16 30 201
2003:10 2 26 62 16 28 188
Liquor 2003:10 6 24 22 7 14 138
Note: # product groups refers to the number of COICOP-5 product groups, # brands is the the
number of specific brands, # stores is the number of distinct stores, # chains is the number of
chains of stores identified by Statistics Denmark, and # zip refers to the two-digit zip codes.
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From the information in the data set we construct individual price trajecto-
ries, i.e., sequences of price quotes for a specific item sold in a specific outlet.
In most cases the trajectories are considerably shorter than 108 months, as ex-
plained above. In figure 1 we show some examples of price spells. These are
chosen to illustrate and represent typical price trajectories in the data. We show
prices of three different products, Coca-Cola, Tuborg beer, and Ålborg Taffel
Akvavit, from three different retailers. As can be seen in the graph, prices do
not change very often; there are long periods over which they remain constant.
The vertical lines in the graphs indicate when there was a change in the excise
tax on that specific type of beverage. This allows us to study how prices on
these particular goods were affected before, during, and after the tax event.
First, judging from these graphs (and also as confirmed to a large extent by
our empirical analysis below), it seems as if retailers do not increase their price
just prior to the tax change. During the month when the new tax was imposed,
retailers also changed their after-tax prices. Looking at the first graph, we
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note that one retailer decided to adjust prices in response to the excise tax
during the first event. Two retailers immediately adjusted prices during the
second event, whereas one retailer waited two months before changing the
price. Also interesting to note is that the price of Coca-Cola is very similar
across the retailers. The jump in the price level between the period covering
the first two events and the last tax event does not represent a general price
fall, but the fact that prices were not collected for the same content. There are
a number of such changes in the sample, as mentioned above.
The second graph shows prices of Tuborg beer. For this type of beverage
we note that there are very few price changes during the first tax event. Two
retailers kept prices constant, whereas one retailer increased the price when
the tax was increased. Around the second tax event we note a case of a sale on
Tuborg: one retailer decided to cut the price temporarily two months before
the tax cut and then decided to let the price return to the previous level. The
following month when the tax was cut, the same retailer decided to decrease
the price again. A similar case of sales is evident for another retailer (the red
line in the graph). The price was temporarily cut a few months after the tax
event and then returned to the pre-tax-change level.
We find quite different behavior of liquor prices, as illustrated in the third
graph, showing the price of Ålborg Taffel Akvavit in three different stores.
In general the price was cut immediately after the tax cut and then remained
fairly constant over time. Judging from these graphs, the frequency of price
changes for both beer and soda seems to exceed the frequency of price changes
on liquor. Furthermore, from these graphs (and inspection of price trajectories
for all other brands and retailers) we conclude that pricing behavior is het-
erogeneous and that the average length of a price spell varies significantly
between products and across retailers.
To illustrate how the frequency of price changes vary over time we show, in
figure 2, the frequency of price changes across the three types of beverages for
the full sample.7 We have also added vertical lines indicating the dates of the
five excise tax changes: black bars indicate excise tax changes on beer, blue
bars indicate excise tax changes on soda, and the black bar indicates an excise
tax change on both soda and liquor. There are a couple of interesting features
to note. First, there is no clear indication that there is an anticipation effect,
i.e., that stores decide to change the price prior to the excise tax change. Sec-
ond, and in accordance with previous results, most stores change their after-tax
prices when the excise tax changes. The frequency of price changes falls sub-
stantially the month after the tax change. Third, there is a clear heterogeneity
across types of beverages. The frequency of price changes in connection with
7 We have used the information given in the data to compute monthly price changes, taking
into account any change in the content of the packages. No other filtering has been used.
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Figure 2
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Note: Black bars indicate excise tax changes on beer, blue bars indicate excise tax changes on
soda, and the red bar indicates an excise tax change on both soda and liquor.
tax changes is highest for soda and liquor, and substantially lower for beer.
There is also an apparent seasonality in price changes: stores tend to adjust
prices in June each year. This pattern is most evident for soda. Fourth, the
frequencies shown in the graph do not indicate that retailers adjust prices on
beverages that are not affected when there is a tax change on other beverages.
Using the frequencies of price adjustments shown in figure 2, we ran re-
gressions with seasonal dummies for each type of beverage where we exclude
the tax events.8 We find that prices on beer are typically adjusted in June each
year, but also in January and May to a large extent. For soda and liquor we find
that prices are adjusted in January. Another question is whether, say, prices of
soda are adjusted at the time of tax changes on beer and/or on liquor. A ca-
sual look at the figure suggests that this is not the case. Unfortunately, it is
not possible to systematically examine this question using the data available,
since prices of the three types of beverages are not collected from the same
store over the full sample. Instead, we make use of the estimated frequency of
8 These results are not shown here, for brevity, but are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 4
Change in Frequency of Price Changes When Taxes Change
Beer Soda Liquor
Tax increase on beer May 1997 0.307*** 0.072*** 0.106***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.007)
Tax increase on soda January 1998 0.056*** 0.702*** 0.083***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.007)
Tax increase on soda January 2001 0.078*** 0.110*** 0.017**
(0.008) (0.013) (0.007)
Tax cut on soda and Liquor October 2003 0.044*** 0.504*** 0.914***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.007)
Tax cut on beer January 2005 0.126*** 0.034*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.007)
Constant 0.098*** 0.120*** 0.071***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.007)
Adj. R2 0.121 0.291 0.651
Obs. 107 107 107
Note: Tax changes are represented by dummy variables equal to one in the month of a tax
change and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are shown within parentheses below each
estimate.
price changes, testing whether the frequency of price changes on (for exam-
ple) beer significantly increases when there are tax changes on soda or liquor.
The results are shown in table 4.
Several interesting features appear in this table. First, as expected, we find
strong positive and significant effects of own tax changes. For example, the tax
increase on beer in 1997 increased the frequency of price changes by 31 %, the
tax cut on soda and liquor in 2003 increased the frequency of price changes by
50 % and 91 %, respectively, and the tax increase on soda in 1998 increased
the frequency of price changes by 70 %. The tax cut on beer in 2005 had only
small effects, and the tax increase on soda in 2001 likewise had only small
effects (positive on beer but negative on soda). Considering the cross effects,
we find that the frequencies of price changes for other types of beverages are
either negative, implying a fall in the frequency, or very slightly positive. One
should also keep in mind that prices of soda and liquor are adjusted in January,
coinciding with most of the tax changes. The tax change in October 2003,
when taxes were cut on both soda and liquor, is an interesting case. As can
be seen in table 4, there is a strong and significant increase in the frequency
of price changes for these two products, but there is also a minor increase in
price adjustments on beer (4.4 % increase). Our conclusion from these results
is that there are only minor or even negative cross effects of tax changes on the
frequency of price changes. Therefore, it is likely that the fact that we cannot
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follow price changes on all three types of beverages in a particular store over
time will not severely bias our results below.
Figure 2 suggests that the frequency of price changes tends to increase after
a tax event. To shed further light on this possibility we compute the absolute
value of the average pretax (over the previous three months) and the absolute
value of the average posttax price change (three months after the tax event
and including the month when the tax was adjusted) and divide by the average
price. Figure 3 shows scatterplots of these price changes. We also include a 45-
degree line in the graphs. In the upper left-hand graph we show a scatterplot
including all three types of beverages. It is not very clear whether the price
changes after tax events exceed those before the tax event. There are many
cases where prices do not change after the tax event and there are a number
of cases where the tax change before the tax event exceeds the average price
change after the event. Looking more closely, we find that the average price
change after the tax event exceeds the average price change before the event
in 68 percent of the cases. The other three graphs show scatterplots for each
type of beverage. There are large differences. For liquor (see the graph on the
lower right-hand side) all except one price change after the tax hike exceeds
the before-event average price change. For soda and beer the shares of cases
where the after-event price change exceeds the before-event price change are
51 percent and 84 percent, respectively. These differences will likely affect
the tax pass-through, and we would expect to find full shifting or overshifting
for liquor and maybe also for soda.
Table 5 shows the frequency of price changes, the size of price changes and
its standard deviation, the fraction of price increases, and the implied duration
computed using the formula 1=ln.1F /, where F is the fraction of retail-
ers changing the price each month. These statistics are computed using the full
sample and all available price trajectories where we have at least 12 months
of available observations.9 In addition to showing aggregated results for each
type of beverage, we also report results for a few different product groups
(COICOP 6-digit level). What is most striking about the statistics in table 5
is that prices of beverages are held constant over longer periods. Looking at
the last column, we find that the average price spells are in the range of 8 to
16 months at the aggregate level. Each month the majority of retailers refrain
from adjusting the price. As expected, prices on beer and soda are adjusted
more frequently than prices on liquor, a finding also evident in figure 1. Look-
ing at the actual size of the price change in percent reported in column 4, we
see that the percentage change is lowest for liquor and highest for beer in tax
class I (Tuborg for example).
9 As in the data shown in figure 2, we have only excluded price trajectories where the content
of the package has changed.
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Figure 3
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Note: The graphs show the absolute value of the average pretax (over the previous three months)
price change and the absolute value of the average posttax price change (three months after the
tax event and including the month when the tax was adjusted), divided by the average price.
5. Empirical Analysis
Following the standard practice in the empirical literature, we estimate the tax
pass-through of excise taxes using the panel-data regression model
pi;j;t D
4X
kD0
ˇki;tk C˛i C˛t C
NX
kD1
kXt C"i;t ; (1)
where pi;j;t is the change in the after-tax price of beverage i in store j be-
tween t and t  1 measured in DKK, i;t is the change in the excise tax
measured in DKK for beverage i at time t , Xt is a vector of N control vari-
ables (to be defined below) that are constant across stores but time-varying,
˛i is fixed effects, ˛t is time effects, and "i;t is the beverage-specific resid-
ual. It is common in the literature studying tax pass-through to include cost
and demand variables (Baker and Brechling, 1992; Besley and Rosen, 1996;
Delipalla and O’Donnel, 2001; Carbonnier, 2007; Alm et al. 2009). We use
the following control variables to take into account costs facing retailers: the
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Table 5
Relationship Between Absolute Change in Prices and Frequency of Price
Changes for Beer, Liquor, and Soda Conditional on at Least 1 Year of
Available Data
Products Obs. Frequency Size of St. dev. Price Duration
price changes price changes increases
Beer
All beer 122 58369 0.061 0.352 2.318 0.419 15.9
Beer tax class I 48 19464 0.090 0.627 3.224 0.680 10.6
Beer tax class I, canned 16 1733 0.062 0.114 0.165 0.454 15.6
Beer tax class II 27 18914 0.052 0.053 0.074 0.670 18.7
Low and nonalcoholic beer 31 18258 0.032 0.077 0.150 0.799 30.7
Soda
All soda 67 21410 0.111 0.155 0.267 0.531 8.5
Soda 20 5435 0.084 0.078 0.076 0.904 11.4
Coca-Cola 40 14831 0.119 0.178 0.299 0.663 7.9
Soda, canned 7 1144 0.047 0.081 0.101 0.296 20.8
Liquor
All spirits and liqueurs 79 30081 0.072 0.046 0.085 0.531 13.4
Aquavit and bitter 2 9470 0.078 0.036 0.066 0.724 12.3
Old Danish 1 10683 0.084 0.030 0.050 0.731 11.4
Gin, vodka, etc. 22 2324 0.059 0.098 0.162 0.630 16.4
Liqueurs 18 3528 0.046 0.084 0.133 0.590 21.2
Whiskey 16 1856 0.051 0.094 0.135 0.553 19.1
Brandy 20 2220 0.041 0.088 0.124 0.500 23.9
Note: The table reports the frequency of price changes per month for each beverage, the average
size of price changes, the standard deviation of the size, and the implied duration computed
using the formula 1=ln.1F/, where F is the frequency of price changes in column 4.
change (Labcost) and the squared change (Labcost2) in unit labor costs, the
rent price index (Rent), and the energy price index (Energy).10 These vari-
ables are time-varying but constant across stores. To capture the developments
in the general price level we add the change (CPI) and squared change in the
consumer price index (CPI2).11 Since we have access to the zip codes of each
store in our sample, we also add disposable income as a proxy for aggregate
demand (Baker and Breichling, 1992). However, Statistics Denmark does not
publish data on disposable income for all zip codes, only for major towns or
10 Initially we also added the squared values of the latter two prices, but found that they were
both insignificant. Therefore we have excluded these squared terms in our base specification.
11 Ideally we should filter out the effects of prices of alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages
from the overall CPI index. However, the weights associated with these products are very
small. Even for large changes in prices of liquor (as was the case in October 2003, when the
excise tax was cut, leading to a fall in the price index on these beverages of about 30 percent),
there was no similar jump in the overall CPI. It is likely that price changes on beverages do
not exert an important influence on the overall CPI.
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regions. In addition, the data is annual, implying that the inclusion of dis-
posable income as an additional control variable amounts to adding another
fixed effect. We have, nevertheless, matched the available income data with
zip codes in our sample. Unfortunately, the number of available observations
falls substantially. Therefore, we focus on results where we exclude dispos-
able income, and then we add this control as a robustness test and present
detailed results in the Appendix.
Given our definition of the variables in our regression model, we find that
the excise tax pass-through is given by p

D P4kD0ˇk . The reason why we al-
low for lagged effects is that it may be that a retailer decides to adjust the price
in the following months after the actual implementation of the new excise
tax.12 In our empirical specification we allow for up to four months delayed
effect on the after-tax prices. This assumption is consistent with the trajecto-
ries shown in figure 1, where some retailers decided to adjust the price just a
few months after the tax event. We will estimate the regression model in equa-
tion (1) for all beverages and tax events as well as for each type of beverage,
to allow us to contrast tax pass-through across beverages. As there are both
tax hikes and tax cuts for soda and beer, we also test for asymmetric responses
in the data. As mentioned above, there are gaps in the data, implying that our
panel is unbalanced. All our estimations take this into account.
5.1. Estimating Excise Tax Pass-through for Types of Beverages
Table 6 reports the baseline regression results.13 The first column reports the
results of using all three types of beverages, and the following columns report
the results for each different type of beverage. We use, as was explained above,
fixed-effects estimators, and we also add time effects.14 As controls we use
changes in rent, energy, and unit labor cost as proxies for costs, and we allow
for nonlinear effects from labor costs. In addition we add changes in the CPI
(and allow for nonlinear effects) to allow for general changes in prices. Below
we will also present results where disposable income is included as a proxy
for aggregate demand.
The first row reports the contemporaneous tax pass-through, with robust
and clustered standard errors within parentheses below the point estimate and
with the p-value of tests for full pass-through, i.e., that the tax pass-through
12 We have also experimented with both fewer and additional lags, but the main results are not
affected.
13 We have estimated the models using pooled OLS, adding fixed effects at the brand level and
at the type of beverage. The results reported are robust to these additional fixed effects.
14 We have used Hausman specification tests to test for the appropriateness of random effects
against fixed effects. The results show that we always can reject the null that the random-
effects model is appropriate.
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Table 6
Estimates of Excise Tax Pass-through for Each Type of Beverage
All beverages Beer Soda Liquor
ˇ0 1.029*** 6.388*** 1.734*** 0.781***
(0.014) (1.091) (0.106) (0.076)
[0.044] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005]P4
kD0ˇk 1.027*** 8.512*** 2.398*** 0.717***
(0.014) (1.671) (0.215) (0.070)
[0.051] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rent 0.021* 0.504*** 0.012 3.761*
(0.011) (0.119) (0.025) (2.067)
CPI 0.061*** 0.277*** 0.114*** 0.127
(0.021) (0.072) (0.036) (1.140)
CPI2 0.090 0.300*** 0.228*** 1.049
(0.074) (0.092) (0.081) (2.255)
Energy 0.020 0.015 0.026*** 0.169
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.164)
Labcost 0.038*** 0.076*** 0.002 0.457**
(0.007) (0.019) (0.008) (0.221)
Labcost2 0.010 0.215*** 0.037* 0.330
(0.007) (0.041) (0.021) (0.285)
Adj. R2 0.920 0.019 0.331 0.930
# Groups 1508 775 595 138
# Obs 15384 8778 4699 1907
Note: The table reports fixed-effects estimates of equation (1) including time effects. Robust and
clustered (on goods) standard errors are reported within parentheses below each point estimate.
p-values of tests of full tax pass-through (that the contemporaneous or total tax pass-through is
equal to unity) are reported within brackets.
is equal to one. Next, we report the sum of the contemporaneous and lagged
(allowing for up to four lags) tax pass-through including standard errors and
the p-values of a test of full pass-through within brackets.
We find in the first column that the contemporaneous pass-through is very
close to one. The same holds when adding up all lagged and contemporane-
ous effects. However, we reject the null hypothesis that the pass-through is
full at the 5 % level. The precision of the estimates, judging from the stan-
dard error, is very high. Turning to the individual beverages, we reject full
tax pass-through in all cases, and we find that the total effect of tax changes
exceeds the contemporaneous effect for beer and soda. In this respect, liquor
behaves differently: the contemporaneous effect exceeds the total effect. An-
other interesting difference is that we find overshooting for beer and soda but
undershooting for liquor. In some cases (all beverages and liquor) we find that
the contemporaneous tax incidence exceeds the lagged effect. This is due to
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negative lagged responses of price changes to tax changes. Figure 3 above sug-
gested that prices of beer and of soda changed prior to the tax events. To shed
further light on the question of anticipation, we run regressions testing explic-
itly if there are significant price changes three months prior to the tax change.
We estimate fixed-effects panel-data models identical to those reported in ta-
ble 6 for each type of beverage. Due to multicollinearity, we can only allow
for three leads and three lags in addition to a contemporaneous effect of tax
changes on prices.15 The results suggest that we can reject anticipation effects
(testing whether the lead effects are significantly different from zero) for soda
(p-value equal to 0.21) and for liquor (p-value equal to 0.60). For beer we
find an anticipation effect for tax cuts (p-value equal to 0.03) but not for tax
hikes (p-value equal to 0.16). According to these results, anticipation effects
do not appear important for soda and liquor.
The control variables are often significant. CPI, energy prices, and labor
cost all exert a positive effect on beverage prices, as expected. Rent is sig-
nificant and negative in three regressions but is insignificant when estimating
the model using soda prices. The last three rows of the table reports the ad-
justed R2, number of groups (beverage price records in a specific store), and
number of observations. Two regressions stand out with respect to R2: those
when using all data, and those when using only data on liquor. By contrast,
we find that the regression using beer prices is not well specified; the R2 is
almost zero. This is surprising, since several of the control variables as well
as the tax change significantly affect beer prices. However, when looking at
the frequencies of price changes on beer, we find that 53 % of the retailers ad-
justed beer prices in connection with the first tax change in May 1997 (3 % of
the stores decreased prices, whereas 50 % increased prices). For the tax cut in
2005 we find that only 16 % of the stores cut the price (16 % of the stores in-
creased prices, and 68 % did not adjust to the tax change). As a consequence,
the explanatory power of tax changes (and controls) is likely to be small when
estimating the model for beer, compared to the regressions for soda and liquor,
where a larger number of prices were adjusted in response to the tax changes.
The regression for soda seems reasonably well specified; the controls explain
about 33 % of soda prices.
The inclusion of disposable income does not affect our main conclusions
for soda and liquor; see table 9 in the appendix. However, the total tax pass-
through using the full sample turns out to be negative, instead of positive as
in our base results, and the estimates for beer change substantially. One rea-
son for these changes is that the estimates when including disposable income
are based on fewer observations and fewer beverages. In our full sample we
have 1508 different price records and 15,384 observations in total, whereas
15 These results are not reported, for brevity, but are available upon request from the authors.
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when including disposable income we only have 988 beverages and 7696 ob-
servations. The number of observations available for beer is 3868 (355 price
records) when including disposable income, but 8778 (775 price records) in
our base case. A closer look at the contemporaneous tax pass-through reveals
a much higher standard deviation for beer (3.1) than for soda (1.8) and for
liquor (0.35). It is likely that this explains why the estimated tax pass-through
for beer (and therefore for all beverages) changes substantially on limiting the
sample.
The data available also allows us to investigate whether there are differ-
ences in how different types of stores (or chains of stores) respond to the tax
changes. We estimate panel-data regressions as above, using the full set of
data, and interact the tax changes with a dummy variable taking on the value
1 to 18 representing each type of stores. Note that Statistics Denmark does
not collect data on all three types of beverages from all of these 18 chains.
Prices of beer and soda are collected from 17 of these chains, whereas prices
of liquor are only collected from seven of them (including one where there are
no collected prices of beer or soda). Two different regressions are estimated.
In the first, we estimate the average tax pass-through for each chain of stores,
using only data on beer and soda. In the second regression, we estimate the
model using the full sample of beverages and distinguish between the three
types, so that we obtain an estimate of the average tax pass-through for each
type of beverage in each of the at most 17 different chains of stores. As above,
we also include all control variables added in the regressions reported in ta-
ble 6. The resulting estimates of the tax pass-through are shown in figure 4.
In the graph on the LHS we show the average tax pass-through on beer and
soda for each chain of stores where data is available, including the 95 % con-
fidence bands. In the RHS graph we distinguish between the all three types
of beverages for each chain of stores. A red horizontal line showing complete
pass-through is added in both graphs.
From the graph on the LHS it is clear that the responses are heterogeneous:
the tax pass-through depends on the type of store the data is collected from.
The pass-through either is complete (not significantly different from zero) or
exceeds complete pass-through. Looking at the confidence bands, we find 16
cases where the bands overlap, indicating a rejection of the null hypothesis that
the pass-through is identical. Indeed, a formal test reveals that we can reject
the null hypothesis that the tax pass-through is equal across all chains of stores.
In the RHS graph we show the estimated tax pass-through on all three types
of beverages for these 18 chains of stores. This figure also suggests a high
degree of heterogeneity, but there is no apparent systematic response. Chains
of stores where the tax pass-through on one type of beverage is sizable do not
respond in a similar way to tax changes on other beverages. For example, in
chain 6 the tax pass-through on beer is very large, whereas the pass-through
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Figure 4
Estimated Tax Pass-through for Different Chains of Stores
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(b) Tax pass−through, beer soda and liquor.
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Note: The LHS graph reports the results from fixed-effects estimates of equation (1) using only
data on beer and soda, where we have added dummy variables representing different chains of
stores. The RHS graph shows fixed-effects estimates of equation (1) for each type of beverage
separately, where we have added dummy variables representing different chains of stores.
on soda is below one. There are only two chains where the pass-through on
soda exceeds the pass-through on beer (chains 17 and 18). The data available
to us does not, unfortunately, allow us to investigate the reasons for these
differences. We have no further information on any distinguishing features of
the chains apart from the zip code.16 Below we will use this information to
test whether the distance to the German border can explain the size of the
tax pass-through. However, in the next section we first turn to the question of
asymmetric responses to tax hikes and tax cuts.
5.2. Testing for Asymmetric Excise Tax Pass-through
In this subsection we estimate and contrast the tax pass-through of tax cuts
and tax hikes. We define a dummy variable (Dit ) equal to one if there is a tax
increase on beverage i and zero otherwise, and we extend equation (1) in the
16 Even though we have access to a rich aggregated data set, it is not possible to disaggregate
down to individual stores in a meaningful way. The number of stores within each chain
ranges between 110 for chain 1 and 5 for chain 4. Looking more closely at chain 1, we find
two different stores where prices are collected on both soda and liquor (four brands in total)
and no store where there are price records on both beer and liquor. The same holds for stores
where we have price records on both beer and soda; at most we find four price records from
these stores. The information that can be extracted from these price records is limited, and
therefore we refrain from looking at the data at the store level.
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following way:
pi;j;t D
4X
kD0
ˇki;tk C
4X
kD0
kDti;tk C˛i C˛t C
NX
kD1
kXt C"i;t ;
(2)
where all variables are defined as in our baseline model. As above, we also
add individual unobserved fixed and time effects.
Table 7 (analogous to table 6) reports the results. In the same way as in
table 6, we provide the estimated contemporaneous effect as well as the total
effect. We also provide a formal test of whether the tax pass-through is equal
during tax cuts and tax hikes; the p-value is reported within brackets. Consider
first our estimates of the excise tax pass-through on all beverages, reported in
the first column. The contemporaneous pass-through of a tax cut is estimated
to be 1.026, which is significantly different from one. We find that the pass-
through during tax hikes is substantially higher, 2.4, also significantly different
from one. Adding the lagged effects of tax changes, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the tax pass-through is equal to one for tax cuts; see the p-
value reported in brackets. By contrast, we find significant overshifting for tax
hikes; the total effect of a tax hike is three times as large as for tax cuts. This
suggests an overall asymmetry in the responses to tax hikes and tax cuts, with
full shifting of tax cuts but overshifting of tax hikes.
Comparing the results for beer and soda (reported in the second and third
columns of table 7), it seems that beer and soda prices respond differently. For
beer we find significant overshifting for both tax cuts and tax hikes, but three
times as large a pass-through for tax hikes; but for soda we find insignificant
response of prices to a tax cut and overshifting of tax hikes. Again we find that
the model does a poor job explaining beer prices; R2 is very small. However,
taking into account the magnitude of the tax changes on beer, which is 0.8 %
for tax hikes versus 3 % for tax cuts, we see that the comparison is inconclu-
sive. The magnitude of the tax change seems to matter. This may explain the
noisy estimates for beer reported in table 7. For soda, on the other hand, the
two tax changes, upward and downward, are of about the same magnitude.
Overall our results in table 7 suggest that the excise tax pass-through ex-
ceeds unity and that the pass-through of tax hikes exceeds that of tax cuts for
soda. These results suggest that retailers may decide not to adjust prices down-
ward in response to tax cuts to the same extent as they respond to tax hikes.
Instead they keep prices unchanged and increase the profit margin. In case of
a tax hike, they respond by increasing prices more than the tax change; our
point estimates suggest very large overshifting. At the same time, the size of
the tax change in relation to the unit price also matters. The tax pass-through
tends to increase with the tax change relative to the unit price. This seems
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Table 7
Testing Asymmetric Excise Tax Pass-through: All Events, Beer and Soda
All beverages Beer Soda
ˇ0 tax cut 1.026*** 7.679*** 0.660***
(0.014) (1.250) (0.221)P4
kD0ˇk tax cut 1.022*** 5.317** 0.095
(0.014) (2.225) (0.631)
[0.111] [0.053] [0.083]
ˇ0 tax hike 2.378*** 2.557 2.152***
(0.316) (1.771) (0.202)P4
kD0ˇk tax hike 3.132*** 16.611*** 2.618***
(0.316) (5.409) (0.619)
[0.000] [0.004] [0.009]
Rent 0.026** 0.431*** 0.099**
(0.011) (0.106) (0.049)
CPI 0.051** 0.257*** 0.042
(0.024) (0.070) (0.031)
CPI2 0.108 0.289*** 0.031
(0.073) (0.091) (0.072)
Energy 0.018 0.012 0.008
(0.016) (0.012) (0.007)
Labcost 0.040*** 0.059*** 0.026
(0.007) (0.019) (0.024)
Labcost2 0.018** 0.191*** 0.036*
(0.008) (0.039) (0.019)
Adj. R2 0.920 0.022 0.333
# Groups 1508 775 595
# Obs. 15384 8778 4699
# Obs. tax cuts 7893 4227 1759
Note: The table reports fixed-effects estimates of equation (2) including time effects. Robust and
clustered (on goods) standard errors are reported within parentheses below each point estimate.
p-values for tests of whether tax pass-through is equal during tax cuts and tax hikes are reported
within brackets.
intuitive and is consistent with previous findings in Karp and Perloff (1989),
Zápal (2014), and Conlon and Rao (2016). In our sample we find that large
relative changes in the excise tax are associated with lower tax pass-through.
For example, the tax increase on beer in 2005 was small in relation to the
average pretax price, while the pass-through was very large. The tax cut on
liquor in 2003 was large relative to the pretax price, and the tax change was
undershifted. Looking more closely at each of our six tax events, it is clear
that relatively large tax changes are associated with lower tax pass-through.
Altogether, these results suggest that policymakers should be cautious not to
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change excise taxes by small amounts, at least if the goal is complete or close
to complete tax pass-through.
6. Border Effects
One underlying argument used by the Danish government for cutting excise
taxes on alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages was to prevent and limit cross-
border trade with Germany, where excise taxes are considerably lower.17 His-
torically, retail prices of soda have been very high in Denmark, much higher
than in most other European countries, including Germany. We would there-
fore expect that the tax pass-through should become smaller as the distance to
the German border decreases. In order to examine if this is the case, we run
regressions similar to the ones presented in table 6 above, adding the distance
to the German border measured in kilometers (the distance from the center of
the zip code to the nearest town in Germany). In order to measure the effect of
the distance to the German border on tax pass-through, we interact the natural
logarithm of the distance and the change in the excise tax. As a consequence,
the tax pass-through will now be a function of the distance. Note that distance
is constant, i.e., not time-varying, for each beverage type i , implying that we
cannot add all constitutive terms as we normally can when introducing inter-
action terms. Instead, these constant differences will be captured by the fixed
effects. We estimate the following regression:
pi;j;t D
4X
kD0
ˇki;tk C
8X
kD5
ˇki;tC5k  lndist C˛i C˛t
C
NX
kD1
kXt C"i;t : (3)
The results are shown in table 8 (analogous to table 6). Note that all control
variables in our base model are included here as well – even the unobserved
fixed and time effects, though they are not reported in the table. A striking re-
sult in the table is the lack of significant tax pass-through (except for beer) and
the fact that the interaction terms are all insignificant. But, as is well known in
the literature, the insignificance of constitutive terms may not reveal whether
or not the tax pass-through as a function of distance, in our case, is signifi-
cant. For this reason we report the pass-through for two cases: the minimum
17 See Bygvrå (1998) for a detailed description of cross-border trade between Denmark and
Germany after the establishment of the Single European Market in 1993. For a more recent
study of cross-border shopping, not only across the Danish–German border but also in other
border regions, see Bygvrå (2018).
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Table 8
Testing German-Border Effects
All beverages Beer Soda Liquor
ˇ0 1.435 4.856** 0.195 1.211
(0.922) (1.970) (1.002) (1.028)P4
kD0ˇk 1.052 3.775 1.188 0.772
(0.922) (3.023) (1.245) (0.869)
ˇ5 0.076 0.301 0.295 0.081
(0.196) (0.373) (0.192) (0.195)P8
kD5ˇtk 0.005 0.925* 0.234 0.010
(0.173) (0.506) (0.236) (0.166)
Tax incidence at min distance 1.035*** 7.177*** 2.049*** 0.734***
(0.285) (1.795) (0.419) (0.264)
Tax incidence at max distance 1.024*** 9.242*** 2.571*** 0.711***
(0.103) (1.734) (0.270) (0.135)
Adj. R2 0.921 0.020 0.335 0.930
# Groups 1507 775 594 138
# Obs 15377 8778 4692 1907
Note: The table reports fixed-effects estimates of equation (3) including time effects as well as
all control variables used in regressions reported in table 6. Robust and clustered (on goods)
standard errors are reported within parentheses below each point estimate. The distance is mea-
sured as the natural logarithm of the distance from the center of the zip code to the closest town
in Germany, measured in kilometers. Tax incidences at min and max distances are the marginal
effects of excise taxes measured at minimum and maximum distance from the German border.
and the maximum distance in our sample. To estimate the tax pass-through
we set all other control variables equal to zero (we compute the partial deriva-
tive of the change in prices with respect to the excise tax change), i.e., the tax
pass-through is computed as
P4
kD0ˇk C
P8
kD5ˇk  lndist .
Turning to the results, we find that there are small and insignificant differ-
ences between the pass-through for retailers located close to the border and
retailers located far away from the border when using the full data set. Dis-
tinguishing between types of beverages, our results reveal that distance is of
importance for both beer and soda but not for liquor. The tax pass-through
increases with distance to the German border for those two types of bever-
ages. There is more overshifting at retailers located far away from the border.
For example, comparing the tax pass-through on beer in Copenhagen (located
215 km from the German border) and in Nykøbing (located only 88 km from
the German border), we find a significantly higher (at the 10-percent level)
pass-through in Copenhagen (increasing from 4.2 to 5.0). For soda we find no
significant difference in the pass-through between these two locations (point
estimates increase from 1.0 to 1.3). To further illustrate these differences, we
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provide a graph of the marginal effects of distance on tax pass-through in
figure 5. The figure clearly illustrates that the pass-through is increasing in
distance. Since taxes and prices are substantially lower on all three types of
beverages in Germany, we would expect a uniform and common pattern in our
data. However, for liquor we find almost no difference in the pass-through;
distance does not seem to matter. One reason for this may be that the size
effect discussed above dominates: the fact that the size of the tax change on
liquor exceeds the tax change on beer and soda and for that reason the tax
pass-through is smaller. Overall, we find that the tax incidence on soda and
beer is affected by proximity to the German border. In this regard, the official
argument underlying these tax changes, in particular the tax cuts, is supported
by empirical evidence.
Figure 5
Effect of (ln) Distance on Tax Pass-through for Beer and Soda
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Note: Marginal effects of distance on tax pass-through, based on estimates in columns 2 and 3
in table 8.
The empirical results discussed above suggested a significant difference in
the tax pass-through between tax cuts and tax hikes. We reestimate the model
in equation (3), adding dummy variables to distinguish between tax hikes and
tax cuts as in equation (2). Figure 6 provides plots of the marginal effects of
distance on the tax pass-through. It is clear that distance to the German border
has different effects on the tax pass-through depending on the type of beverage
and also on whether taxes are raised or lowered. Figure 6a shows the marginal
effects of distance conditional on a tax cut. For stores located very close to
the German border we find an insignificant tax pass-through. As the distance
is increased, tax pass-through becomes statistically significant and increases
from roughly 4 to 6. The pattern is similar for tax hikes, but the pass-through
is substantially larger and the marginal-effect curve is less steep. In both cases,
distance is a complement in the tax pass-through. The response of soda prices
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Figure 6
Effect of (ln) Distance on Tax Pass-through for Beer and Soda,
Distinguishing Between Tax Cuts and Tax Hikes
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Note: Marginal effects of distance on tax pass-through, based on extended estimates in columns
2 and 3 in table 8, where we distinguish between tax hikes and tax cuts.
is completely different. For tax cuts we find no significant marginal effect of
distance, and for tax hikes we find no complementarity. In fact, the marginal
effect is downward sloping, but there is no significant difference in the tax
pass-through at minimum and maximum distances. Comparing beer and soda,
we also note, as was also evident in our initial empirical tests, that the pass-
through of tax hikes on beer is more than three times as large as on soda.
7. Conclusions
This paper has focused on excise tax shifting for alcoholic and nonalcoholic
beverages in Denmark. Using micro data collected by Statistics Denmark, we
estimate the excise tax pass-through on after-tax beverage prices during six
tax events: three tax increases and three tax cuts. Our main finding is that
excise taxes on beer and soda are overshifted to consumers, whereas we find
undershifting for liquor. Considering the relative size of the tax change in rela-
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tion to the pretax price, it seems that small tax changes tend to be overshifted
while larger tax changes are undershifted, as found earlier by Karp and Perloff
(1989), Zápal (2014), and Conlon and Rao (2016). In the Danish case, the tax
changes on beer and soda are very small (in the range from less than 1 percent
to around 5 percent), whereas they were at least 30 percent for liquor, de-
pending on the brand. However, there is a high degree of heterogeneity across
chains of stores; for some chains we find overshifting, and in a few full shift-
ing. There is also evidence suggesting asymmetric responses to tax cuts and
tax hikes. We find that excise taxes are overshifted to a larger extent following
tax hikes than following tax cuts on soda. It is unlikely that the size of the tax
changes explains this finding, since the size of the tax cut on soda exceeds the
size of the tax hikes.
Our empirical analysis also suggests that proximity to the German border
affects the tax pass-through. Estimates for beer and soda suggest that the tax
pass-through is increasing in the distance to the border. Higher competition
from border trade makes retailers more inclined to limit price changes when
excise taxes change, particularly when there is a tax hike. Surprisingly, our
results also suggest that distance has no significant effect on soda prices fol-
lowing a tax cut.
These findings are consistent with recent studies of SSBs implemented in
Berkeley (Falbe et al., 2015; Falbe et al., 2016; Crowley and Frisvold, 2017)
suggesting undershifting, and in Mexico (Grogger, 2017) suggesting over-
shifting. The tax change relative to the base price is larger in Berkeley than
in Mexico. For beer, our findings are consistent with previous results, which
very often but not always find overshifting. A striking difference between our
results and what is found in the previous literature is that we find undershift-
ing of excise taxes on liquor. A possible explanation is that the tax change on
liquor in Denmark was much larger in relation to the base price than in other
countries.
The finding that the response is either undershifting or overshifting is con-
sistent with the market conditions in the retail sector in Denmark. The market
is segmented, and it is likely that retailers can deviate from market prices even
though they at the same time compete over customers. A distinguishing fea-
ture of the retail market is that there are many small supermarkets located
close to each other and very few large supermarkets. Most supermarkets sell
all three types of beverages that we focus on in this paper, and it is surprising
that the tax pass-through differs across the three different types of beverages.
However, the size of the tax change in relation to the pretax price could explain
why we find different results for the three types of beverages.
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8. Appendix: Tax Pass-through Conditional on Disposable
Income
Table 9
Estimates of Excise Tax Pass-through for Each Type of Beverage,
Conditional on Disposable Income
All beverages Beer Soda Liquor
ˇ0 1.022*** 0.519 2.036*** 0.813***
(0.015) (1.089) (0.245) (0.083)
[0.139] [0.164] [0.000] [0.027]P4
kD0ˇk 1.229** 0.180 3.450*** 0.784***
(0.523) (1.524) (0.919) (0.077)
[0.000] [0.591] [0.008] [0.006]
Rent 0.029 0.128 0.063 121.282**
(0.024) (0.124) (0.050) (53.967)
CPI 0.079 0.038 0.022 11.954***
(0.070) (0.090) (0.670) (4.005)
CPI2 0.241** 0.042 0.124 29.577***
(0.107) (0.068) (1.542) (8.250)
Energy 0.139** 0.017 0.109 7.665***
(0.055) (0.016) (0.090) (2.736)
Labcost 0.077*** 0.008 0.033 Omitted
(0.014) (0.022) (0.097)
Labcost2 0.187*** 0.030 0.037 Omitted
(0.047) (0.046) (0.175)
Income 0.987 0.145 0.755 Omitted
(0.934) (0.623) (0.756)
Adj. R2 0.940 0.018 0.377 0.944
# Groups 988 355 505 128
# Obs 7696 3868 3194 634
Note: “Income” is the natural logarithm of annual disposable income in different regions defined
using zip codes matched to zip codes associated with the location of stores. The table reports
fixed-effects estimates of equation (1) including time effects. Robust and clustered (on goods)
standard errors are reported within parentheses below each point estimate. p-values of tests of
full tax pass-through (that the contemporaneous or total tax pass-through is equal to unity) are
reported within brackets.
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